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Constructing a Person
A Clue to the New Unity of the Arts and Sciences
Joseph Margolis
1 It  is  certainly  true  that  no  one  has  demonstrated  the  sheer  falsity  of  claiming  that
whatever we count among the most  distinctive things of  the human world (persons,
surely) or that whatever are rightly included among the most salient anthropocentric
properties ascribed such things (a capacity for speech and self-reference, for productive
and self-transformative agency, and for avowing beliefs, intentions, feelings and the like)
are reducible in physicalist terms. Nevertheless, the prospects of a “human science” (a
science of the human) confined in reductive terms are very slim indeed – effectively nil.
So that if the admission of the realist standing of the human world obliged us to weigh
seriously the compatibility between a causal theory of human agency and the usual causal
canons favored in the physical sciences, we might be forced to concede that deciding
what  a  true  science  entails  would  itself  be  hostage  to  the  contingent  difficulties  of
completing any reductive undertaking here.
2 The very idea of agency, I suggest, requires an “internalist” rather than an “externalist”
causal  model.  Think for instance of  Wittgenstein’s  example of  “my raising my arm”,
which, speaking unguardedly, we say “causes” or “brings about” or (as I prefer to say)
“utters” the action in question – which entails but does not cause “my arm’s rising.”1 We
cannot say that an agent’s raising his arm causes (in the externalist way) his arm to rise,
because  of  course  the  bodily  movement,  the  arm’s  rising,  is  nothing other  than the
material event by which the enabling action is itself inseparably realized. The “uttering”
of  the action and the action “uttered” are  never  more than internally  distinguished
within a successful action: they are never more than notionally distinct, never jointly
separable  in  the  way  the  externalist  model  of  causality  requires;  and  the  entailed
movements  of  the  arm  that  would  ordinarily  be  identified  and  explained  in  the
externalist  way  are  no  more  than  the  logically  dependent  subfunctionally  factored
functioning “parts” of the molar action in question, hence not themselves actions in any
pertinent sense at all. On the reductionist model, the would-be action should ultimately
be no more than a selected set of movements of the kind just conceded, which would
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effectively retire agency in favor of some Humean-like externalist causal linkage (without
reference to agents or persons); and on the agency model, what might otherwise have
redeemed  the  reductionist  thesis  would  now  be  incorporated,  subsumed  without
distortion,  as  no  more  than  externally  related  bodily  movements  answering  to  the
factored subfunctions of the original action’s molar process, without reference to which
their causal relevance would remain unspecified.
3 In this sense, the internalist and externalist models are reconcilable, but only on terms
favorable to the agency model; on the externalist model, agency would be abandoned
altogether or reduced to a façon de parler.  It  was,  in fact,  Arthur Danto’s very clever
conjecture (within the first decade of the publication of Wittgenstein’s Investigations) that
suggested that  the linkage between actions and bodily  movements  (in Wittgenstein’s
example)  held the key to how we might understand the conceptual  linkage between
paintings as artworks and mere canvases covered with paint, which obliquely afforded
the  perfect  clue  as  to  how to  construe  the  conceptual  relationship  between  human
culture and physical nature – a fortiori, between the human and the natural sciences.2 The
fact that Danto took a fashionably wrong turn here is no more than a minor complication:
the larger lesson rests with the structural analogies disclosed. As far as I know, Danto
never explains the difference between nature and culture.
4 You begin to realize that Wittgenstein’s extraordinary question renders the entire fabric
of scientific explanation instantly vulnerable in a way it had never seemed before: we are
no longer certain what causality means in the physical world or whether it applies in its
usual way to human agency; we find ourselves unclear about how to mark the difference
between the “natural” and the “human” worlds; and we begin to wonder about what
distinguishes science from non-science and what to understand by the very idea of causal
explanation. Certainly, there is no prospect of arriving a priori at a uniquely convincing
picture of  “the method of  science”:  Hume and Kant  – who,  between them,  gave the
strongest  possible  reasons  for  impoverishing  our  conception  of  the  self  and  whose
influence in this respect may have had a considerable role to play in encouraging, in the
20th century, the return of an analytic bias against enriching that conception – might
then  be  deemed  to  have  been  seriously  mistaken  in  their  grandest  ventures.  The
methodology of the sciences would then be open to dispute in a very deep way: the idea of
the unity of the sciences might remain as insistent as ever but now no longer on the basis
of any fashionable model that favored reductionism or an externalist causal model or the
primacy of an extensionalist idiom of description and causal explanation or indeed the
irreplaceability of the covering law model of explanation.
5 Danto, I might add, took the wrong turn, not in Hume’s and Kant’s way by impoverishing
our conception of  the functional  identity of  persons but  by compartmentalizing (I’m
afraid) the analysis of human agency and the proposed reduction of actions to bodily
movements;  a  fortiori,  the  reduction  of  paintings  to  painted  canvases  and  speech  to
uttered sound, as far as numerical identity is concerned. If you allow these analogies to
point to the right analysis of the conceptual linkage between culture and nature (which I
judge Wittgenstein to have been alluding to) then the would-be reduction of historical
deeds to mere bodily movements (by the rhetoric of external redescription applied to
bodily movements that we wish to treat as actions) would ineluctably put at risk the
coherence of any theory of persons or of the human sciences. There’s the threatened
reductio.3
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6 We cannot  manage by merely  piecemeal  strategies  the reduction of  action to  bodily
movement or of paintings to canvases covered with paint or speech to sound and hope to
keep our account of the robust existence of persons or selves (ourselves of course) free of
reductive risk. All of these bits of analysis must cohere together. Similarly, we cannot
insist  on the unity of  science ranging over the human sciences in the same way the
doctrine  is  said  to  apply  to  the  natural  sciences,  as  by  the  positivists,  if  the  theory
requires (as it obviously does) an externalist model of causality that could not be applied
to human agency unless the agency of human persons were itself reducible – but not
otherwise. These interlocking conceptual linkages are much too complex to be treated
lightly. Wittgenstein’s question cannot be easily answered.
7 In fact, the realist standing of human persons is well-nigh irresistible, even where it is
combated  by  skillful  strategies.  Because  reductionism in  its  strictest  sense  does  not
actually require the elimination of persons or even the defeat of every form of dualism;
because no thoroughgoing reductionism has ever achieved a degree of mastery sufficient
to tempt us in the direction of eliminativism; because, for technical as well as practical
reasons,  the  sheer  collection of  data,  our  unquestioned reliance  on the  resources  of
experience, the proposal and testing of explanatory hypotheses, deliberate commitments
to tasks and purposes of consequence make no sense at all without the presence of human
persons. This is the larger meaning of P. F. Strawson’s well-known objection to the “no-
ownership” theory of perception and thought, although Strawson himself is remarkably
lax in his account of persons.4 It’s also the larger meaning of opposing the usual forms of
the so-called “super- venience” theory of the mental – Jaegwon Kim’s for instance. You
have  only  to  think  of  contrasting  Hegel  with  Kant  and  Thomas  Reid  with  Hume  to
appreciate the implied contest.
8 Strawson’s  argument  and  the  argument  against  Kim  draw  on  surprisingly  similar
strategies, though they are applied in opposite directions and may be rendered well-nigh
vacuous. In effect, Strawson’s argument, which captures a very strong intuition of what
may  be  called  philosophical  grammar,  holds  that  feelings,  perceptions,  thought,
intentions and the like must be “adequated” to some existent “subject,” agent, organism,
or  self  capable  of  “possessing”  or  manifesting  “mental  states”;  such  states  and
occurrences, as of sleep and memory (as we now understand matters), cannot (Strawson
argues) be merely contingently or “externally” predicable of the subjects that possess
them, though Strawson mistakenly believed that what it was to be a “subject” hardly
needed to be elaborated by much to make the point.
9 Kim’s argument, which treats the mental as supervening on the physical in accord with
strict causal laws and which supports in that way (and is supported by) the thesis of the
“causal closure of the physical” nevertheless fails (for question begging reasons) to come
to terms with another intuition of philosophical grammar, namely, that (as in treating a
chess move as causally efficacious, in accord with the sense of Wittgenstein’s example) a
feeling or  a  thought  must  not  only be possessed by a  subject,  as  an action must  be
embodied in a physical movement, but the “internal” causal linkages involved can be
(dependently)  specified  on  and  only  on  the  logically  prior  admission  of  the  would-be
supervenient state or occurrence in question – which, of course, implicates the human
subject. Thus the material conditions pertinent to the causal efficacy of a chess move are
meaningfully specified only as factorially internal “parts” of the would-be supervenient
action itself: a chess move may be locally performed in endlessly many ways, though,
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identified thus, chess moves remain open to informal causal generalizations but hardly to
universal or necessary causal laws. Hence, Kim’s analyses put the cart before the horse.
⁂
10 Let me put this more forcefully since the problem that Kim considers is ubiquitous with
regard to cultural things and to the cultural “penetration” of mind and action (as through
language and what language conveys in the way of theory and interpretation and the
like): the problem cannot be confined to the biology of the mind. I don’t believe Kim, who
may well be the most skillful and unyielding reductionist of the current Anglo-American
analytic movement, ever offers a reductionist account of languaged thought or speech;
and yet, of course, without success there, reductionism would be dead in the water.
11 Apart from that, Kim is committed among his most recent discussions to the following
thesis, which he calls “conditional physical reductionism, the thesis that if mental properties
are to be causally efficacious, they must be physically reducible.” Now, this doctrine is
meant to provide an answer to the problems of “mental causation and consciousness,”
which, effectively, construes these questions in a peculiarly restricted way:
Each poses a fundamental challenge [Kim concedes] to the physicalist worldview.
How can the mind exercise its causal powers in a causally closed physical world?
What is there, and how can there be, such a thing as the mind, or consciousness, in
a physical world?5
12 It’s important to understand that the distinction of the cultural world and of the human
sciences and studies that address that world requires the defeat (or stalemate) of Kim’s
version of  reductionism (which affects the fortunes of  a very large swath of  familiar
forms of the doctrine); but then we must also see why supervenientism fails on its own
terms.
13 The answer is  straightforward but  needs some care.  It’s  worth remarking that  Kim’s
solution is not troubled by any hint of dualism; on the contrary, Kim regards his thesis as
made stronger by its compatibility with dualism: because of course dualism would have
no adverse bearing on the causal question if Kim’s “conditional physical reductionism”
were true.
14 That  would  count  as  an  interesting  gain  –  compatible  for  instance  with
epiphenomenalism and the classic forms of emergentism. It helps to explain why Kim’s
usual treatment of the “mental” (wherever the mental plays a causal role) deliberately
yields in the dualist direction – though not of course in any way meant to agree with
Descartes’s causal doctrine. Tangential questions, you realize, threaten to overwhelm us
here:  we must keep our discussion of  the mental  as close as possible to the cultural
“penetration” and transformation of our biological gifts; we must hold fast to the agency
of persons;  and we must keep before us the differences between the human and the
natural sciences. These are our principal touchstones.
15 The trouble with Kim’s supervenientism is that it completely neglects a natural option (a
stronger  option  in  my  opinion)  that  arises  in  connection  with  the  distinct  kinds  of
evolution separately implicated in consciousness (or mind) and in the cultural world. For
one thing, if dualism is a conceptual scandal both metaphysically and causally, then it’s
more reasonable to treat the evolution of mind and culture non-dualistically if we can –
and of course we can. And for another, it’s reasonable to think of the evolution of mind as
thoroughly  biological,  but  not  the  evolution  of  culture –  hence  not  the  cultural
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transformation or  Bildung  of  the  mind.6 For  even if  the  “mental”  and the  “cultural”
possess physical features (as perception, thought, and speech do), Kim’s entire argument
would still risk irrelevance. Indeed, it’s not only possible – it’s true – (i) that there are
events  that  we  characterize  as  mental  or  culturally  significant  that  possess  physical
features  of  their  own  and  produce  effects  in  the  physical  world  that  cannot  be
convincingly replaced by mere physical sequences:  a verbal insult,  say,  that produces
anger and the reddening of  the face;  and (ii)  that  what is  “emergent” here in some
pertinently evolutionary sense is not “supervenient” according to Kim’s formula, because
of course supervenience is  explicitly dualistic whereas cultural  emergence is  not and
because the material realization of the culturally emergent is logically inseparable from
what is actually emergent. How could it be otherwise?
16 If  you grant  all  this,  you grasp the sense in which Kim’s  argument relies  on a deep
equivocation that he seems never to have addressed or to have thought needed to be
addressed. He’s missed the most important possibility! Here’s the evidence:
Mental properties [Kim says] supervene on physical properties, in that necessarily,
for any mental property M, if anything has M at time t, there exists a physical base
(or subvenient) property P such that it has P at t, and necessarily anything that has
P at a time has M at that time.7
17 But  this  cannot  be  true  or  even  relevant  if  there  are  no  psychophysical  laws  or
reductionist laws by which to validate the last clause of Kim’s formulation. But there are
no  laws  linking  the  cultural  and  the  physical,  or  mental  powers  that  are  culturally
penetrated – because in introducing cultural events we already make provision for those
subfunctional  physical  events  by  which  the  cultural  is  duly  realized.  In  fact,  quite
independently,  there is  no known argument to show that there are any necessary or
exceptionless causal laws at all, or that the commitment to exceptionless laws cannot be
abandoned without loss.8
18 Admitting the larger argument against reductionism obliges its advocates and allies to
muster a better campaign than they thus far have. Strawson himself, conceivably because
he failed to distinguish (in Individuals) between his own (intended) theory of persons and
an unsatisfactory dualism, or (say) a self-styled hermeneut like Charles Taylor, who never
quite realizes that the choice between reductionism and the hermeneutic vision cannot
for the strictest of reasons assume a disjunctive form, cannot be an effective guide.9 The
reason is plain:  a consistent reductionism can perfectly well  admit the entire human
world and (as Kim argues) at least some standard forms of dualism, and still coherently
seek to “reduce” the description and explanation of its features in materialist terms. That
is in fact reductionism’s charge. Taylor neglects this elementary truth. In fact, given the
history of what counts as “matter” in the physical sciences, it would not be beyond reason
to recommend we dub the mental and the cultural as “material” phenomena themselves –
obviating thereby the reductionist’s supposed advantage at a stroke.
19 But if you grasp all this, you cannot fail to see that the same question confronts us when
we worry whether reductionism affords the right relationship between the natural and
the human sciences or between the arts and the sciences or between theory and practice.
The reason is simply that, prima facie, human persons are the ineliminable agents of all the
arts  and sciences  –  the “middle  term,”  so to say,  of  any argument  recommending a
redefinition (modest or radical) of what, philosophically, to understand an art or science
to be.  And there,  though it  may seem otherwise,  the theory of  the  human self,  the
paradigmatic agent or subject of action and utterance – or of thought, perception and
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feeling, or of purpose, intention and commitment, or of responsibility, interpretation and
appreciation, or of technology and creativity – is a theory about one and the same being. I
don’t mean to disallow eliminativism in principle. But certainly, it would be absurd to
ignore the fact that, in denying that there are persons, that is, existing persons – a thesis
Wilfrid Sellars manfully tried to show us a way of eliminating10 though it’s very likely
Sellars’s effort was meant to be no more than a thought-experiment, possibly a joke, since
he willingly restored persons and what he called their “intentions” to their ordinary
niches,  by  trivial  rhetorical  “addition”  –  we  would  still  be  bound  to  deny  our  own
existence!
⁂
20 There’s a deep puzzle there. Strawson’s objection to the no-ownership theory may be
reasonably reinterpreted as a grammatical rather than an explicitly metaphysical thesis,
meaning by that that what we informally call “the mind” is intended to collect our sense
of the functional coherence, even unity, of a set of distinctive attributes instantiated in
the lives of human beings: “mind” is the nominalization of that sort of functional unity,
whatever may prove to be a perspicuous theory of the “I” or “self” or “soul” of the human
world or its  animal  or (possibly)  its  machine surrogates among robotic selves.  Derek
Parfit, for instance, in what may be the first of his penetrating efforts to define what is
minimally necessary in theorizing about the “subject” of thought, experience, memory,
and action,  failed to concede the full  force of  Strawson’s  complaint  –  which,  rightly
applied, counts as a severe objection to both Hume and Kant (though for very different
reasons).11 Parfit disjoined attribute and referent grammatically (or logically) when he
rightly objected to excessively grand theories of some substantive “I” ranging over the
whole or large phases of human life. Nevertheless, at least two very ardent eliminativists,
Daniel  Dennett  and  Paul  Churchland,  were,  I  think,  literally  convinced  by  Sellars’s
arguments.12 Not, I may say, Sellars himself, as far as the evidence goes.
21 Also, in admitting the “existence” of persons we are not yet obliged (let it be noted) to
hold that persons are or are not substances or entities of any canonically familiar sort
(the Aristotelian sort,  for example).  Perhaps “person” need signify no more than the
notional site or seat of certain culturally emergent competences that cannot be described
or explained in terms of the merely natural biological powers of the animal species Homo
sapiens. “Person” and “organism” may well be conceptually incommensurable distinctions
though not for that reason incompatible categories affecting the would-be unity of the
sciences. In any case we cannot rightly give an account of the “unity” of the sciences, or
the unity of the arts and sciences or of theoretical and practical concerns, without a
robust  theory  of  the  agency  of  persons,  unless  we  turn  (unwisely,  as  the  evidence
suggests) in the direction of reductionism.
22 The logic is clear but the metaphysics is disputed. It’s worth pondering, therefore, why
the admission of intelligent animals – dogs, elephants, chimpanzees, dolphins – does not
oblige us to exceed the functional coherence and unity of such creatures’ lives in the
direction of the conceptually swollen theories usually reserved for humans. The obvious
answer concerns the sui generis emergence of the cultural and the cultural penetration
(and artifactual transformation) of our animal powers and the absence among the most
intelligent animals of more than an incipient form of proto-cultural learning too weak to
give evidence of any artifactual “I.” It’s the artifactual “I,” which the mastery of language
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entails and makes possible, that compensates more than adequately for the impoverished
theories of Hume and Kant. The point is that confirmation of the presence of the “I” is 
empirical,  though  not  phenomenal  in  the  empiricist  sense  or,  a fortiori,  rationally
necessary in the transcendental sense. We can actually witness the growth of the “I”
among our children.
23 Persons or selves, I would say, are, paradigmatically, the artifactual sites of our culturally
acquired powers, exerted in whatever transformative ways they are through whatever is
biologically given by our membership in Homo sapiens. It may then be ultimately more
important to enrich our sense of the functional powers of persons than to speculate on
any “substantial” difference between mind and matter.  Kant’s  surprisingly misguided
elaboration  of  what  he  calls  the  “concept  or  judgment”  of  the  “I  think”  (his
transcendental revision of Descartes’s Cogito: Ich denke) – somehow added to (or made to
“accompany”) the putatively completed system of his transcendental categories – surely
counts  as  an  embarrassing  lesson.  But  if  that  is  true,  then  so,  too,  is  Dennett’s
impoverishment  of  the  human  “mind,”  where  what  may  be  needed  are  promising
thought-experiments capable of eclipsing eliminativist options.13
24 It comes as a surprise to discover how entrenched an animus there is against persons or
selves in modern Eurocentric philosophy: either against their very existence
(eliminativism) or against their possessing a perceptually discernible nature matching
their apparent form of life – as, among 18th century theories, following the decline of
rationalism, in the views of  figures like Hume and Kant:  after failing in the relevant
regard, empiricism and transcendentalism have led the analytic temperament back to
reductionism and dualism – our prevailing contemporary preferences. Hume cannot find
any empiricist datum to count as the “I” of any of “us” – rightly so; and Kant is all but
defeated by having to attach to his perfectly closed system of categories the external,
oddly fitted, almost entirely undefended and unexplained function of the “I think,” which
he renders as a surd that has no other purpose but to “accompany” or “introduce” (as he
puts it) the categories themselves applied to sensuous intuitions – so as not to produce
unwanted paralogisms.
25 We must remember not to impoverish our account of the human mind in our zeal to favor
one or  another  theory  of  the  various  sciences  and arts,  or  practical  and theoretical
concerns. There you have the decisive clue to the strategic importance of our conception
of persons or selves in seeking a rapprochement between (say) the analysis of painting
and literature and the analysis of physical processes and the existence of human societies.
On  its  face,  it  seems  preposterous  to  suppose  that  the  description,  interpretation,
explanation,  and appreciation of  what  obtains  in  the  arts  and sciences  would  never
require  the  robust  role  of  a  reflective  “I,”  however  subject  it  may  be  to  historied
conviction and evolving experience and interest. The 18th century was doubly victimized
by the effective absence of the conceptual resources of modern evolutionary theory and
the historied sui  generis  emergence of the cultural world from the biological:  without
these, it’s quite impossible to construe the human “I” as an artifactual achievement; and
without that extraordinary invention, the entire puzzle of the human sciences would
make no sense at all.
26 By the close of the 18th century, Hume and Kant take command of the two principal
forms of subjectivism – one psychologistic, the other not – which in a curious way are
inseparable from one another and plainly dominate a very large part of the subsequent
history of philosophy down to our own day. Their theories, however, have impoverished
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our picture of  the human subject,  and have,  as a consequence,  provoked a profound
reaction among the post-Kantian Idealists and their immense progeny ranging among the
existentialists,  the  Marxists,  the  pragmatists,  the  champions  of  Lebensphilosophie,  the
hermeneuts, the Nietzscheans, the phenomenologists, the Freudians, the Heideggerians,
the  advocates  of  Weltanschauungsphilosophie,  the  Frankfurt  Critical  school,  the
Wittgensteinians,  and  others,  who  hurry  to  re-enchant  the  world  by  restoring  an
enhanced account of what it is to be a human person.
27 Here, I find the most important, most inventive sources of the philosophical recuperation
of the human to be the following two 19th century contributions: namely, Hegel’s notion
of  historicity  and  Darwin’s  theory  of  evolution.  Without  pausing  to  explain  for  the
moment the terms of art I favor here, let me say that Hegel provides the most important
new conception of what may be termed “internal Bildung,” a notion (still borrowing from
the German to explain the Greek) akin to Aristotle’s themes of sittlich education, as in his
Ethics, Politics, Poetics, and Rhetoric, except for the fact that Bildung must be construed as a
specifically  enculturing  form  of  instruction  under  the  condition  of  historicity  –
distinctions Aristotle was all but completely unaware of, which surface incipiently in the
18th century in Vico and Herder and find their first  great conceptual  articulation in
Hegel’s remarkable achievement.14
28 Hegel’s theory is an expression of high philosophy, but Darwin’s is not. Darwin provides
the essential empirical grounds for the elaboration of what (by a term of art) I shall call
“external Bildung,” meaning by that the gradual evolution of prehuman and proto-human
modes  of  intelligence  and  communication  close  to  achieving  the  rudiments  of  true
language and the forms of self-reference and self-identity and other sui generis skills that
(we take to) constitute the first appearance of those all-important cultural artifacts – those
“second-natured” hybrid creatures – we call persons. Of course, affirming all this counts
as issuing a very large promissory note. But I must offer a more pointed sense of the novel
“entity” I’m enlisting before we allow ourselves to become completely occupied with its
defense.
29 I take persons to be a certain kind of cultural construct, enjoying realist standing as such,
which, if true, could not have been rightly defined philosophically until about the turn
into the 19th century or after Darwin. This literally means that, for somewhat more than
the first two millennia of the whole of Western philosophy (which is itself nearly the
whole  of  Western  philosophy),  it  was  literally  impossible  to  formulate  a  reasonably
correct  “metaphysics”  or  “philosophical  anthropology”  of  the  human.  I  find  that  a
stunning admission,  closely  related (in  my mind)  to the explanation of  Plato’s  futile
attraction to the Forms when, defining the virtues in the elenctic dialogues,  Socrates
clearly  lacks  any  conceptual  resources  that  might  have  made  it  possible  to  avoid
admitting the Forms – in proposing (say) the radical idea of the cultural construction or
constitution of the virtues themselves, a thesis that very naturally matches the idea of the
cultural  construction of  persons.  Think of  the  paradox of  attempting to  explain  the
Socratic virtues in a Darwinian world in which the human species had not yet evolved! To
grasp the lesson is to grasp the insuperable impoverishment of rationalist, empiricist,
transcendentalist,  and  Idealist  options:  we  cannot  advance  beyond  one  or  another
constructivist constraint.
30 Plato clearly has the use of  the concept of paideia (internal Bildung)  but not external
Bildung in anything like the sense that would admit the primordial appearance of the
human. I find it suggestive to think of persons as “natural artifacts,” meaning by that
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that,  in  their  merely  biological  niche,  they  are  incompletely  formed  for  their
characteristic cultural role; hence also, that their biological gifts prepare them for their
“second-natured” enculturation: their mastery of a home language, for example.15 The
human sciences are focused on the sui generis powers of a hybrid being that is “artifactual
by  nature”  (that  is,  by  becoming  “second-natured”).  If  then  you take  the  liberty  of
characterizing mind and culture as “material” – meaning to equate the natural and the
material uncontroversially – you realize that you’ve stalemated reductionism, dualism,
and eliminativism at a stroke without yet declaring what the distinction of the human
world actually is.
31 Let me put the point a little more quarrelsomely. Aristotle, I suggest, never needed to
invoke what I’m calling “external Bildung” because, whatever his temptation, he never
seriously exceeded a sittlich reading of the normative (if  I  may put the matter thus);
whereas, already in the Republic, Plato pursues the supposed discovery of the ultimate
Forms by which all questions of right conduct and right belief are said to be governed.
Hence, Aristotle constructs a reasonable picture of the good life and the good polis largely
in terms of his comfortable attraction to Athenian life; similarly, a reasonable picture of
the best of Greek tragedy, in accord with his preference for Sophocles. Whereas Plato
makes it clear that, on the strength of Socrates’s project (in the Republic), Homer and the
most admired poets will have to be exiled from the ideal state. If the Forms must and can
be contested,  then,  as history makes clear,  we cannot fail  to address the question of
“external  Bildung,”  since the choice  of  supposedly real  norms of  goodness  and truth
would still confront us if we conceded that truth and goodness must have an artifactual
provenance. I view that as a radical option to which we are inexorably driven.
⁂
32 Once you glimpse the force of this last challenge, you begin to see the extraordinary
paradox produced by Hume and Kant in impoverishing (in their very different ways) the
notion of the “I,” the notion of the subject and agent of everything distinctly human. As I
say, the self becomes a surd in Hume’s official philosophy: Hume retreats very cannily
(when he wishes) to the idiom of ordinary humanity when, very sensibly, he overtakes
the  scandalous  threat  of  the  “no-ownership”  thesis;  for  his  part,  Kant  enriches  the
transcendental subject’s judgments regarding the standing of Euclid’s geometry, moral
obligation,  and  the  disinterested  pleasure  of  natural  beauty;  but  he  never  quite
acknowledges how much more in the way of conceptual resources he actually needs in
order to account for instance for at least the history of science (if not also the history of
morality  and an engagement  with the fine arts)  and what  in  particular  he needs  to
acknowledge transcendentally about the “I”‘s agency apart from the categories and pure
intuitions the “I” applies to sensuous intuition. He simply does not assign sufficiently
detailed  powers  to  his  transcendental  ego  to  accomplish  its  usual  chores  even  with
respect to the principal kinds of judgments he examines – or to explain how those powers
arise.
33 Kant’s  third  Critique  provides  the  most  notorious  evidence in  support  of  the  charge,
particularly if you read its argument as an emendation of the first Critique. There’s next to
nothing in the first part of the third Critique – bearing on the resources of the mind – to
account in transcendental terms for any familiar creative or critical practice regarding
the fine arts – or “language” or “history” or “culture” in the large. Kant is driven, for
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example in his gymnastic speculations about new ways to trick the faculty of imagination
into applying the concepts  of  the understanding to our interest  in artworks (or  our
appreciation of beauty in nature of course), in a way that would not violate his well-
known taboo against treating aesthetic judgments as cognitive in any sense. This is a
hothouse quarrel, I concede, but it yields a compelling lesson nevertheless. I’m interested
here  not  so  much  in  the  local  puzzles  of  moral  and  aesthetic  theory  as  in  the
consequences  (for  any  compliant  philosophy)  of  Kant’s  having  impoverished  our
conception of the “I” – and his having failed for that reason to realize how doing that 
renders every part of his own philosophy conditionally suspect and arbitrary. Hard as it is
to believe, Kant seems not to have noticed that the entire structure of the first Critique,
preeminently  the strategic  function of  the  closed system of  the  categories  and pure
intuitions of the understanding, depend on the legitimate cognitive powers of the “I”
rather than on the seeming sufficiency of our guesses at the completeness of his proposed
run of fundamental categories. In any case, you cannot have the one without the other.
34 We’re speaking here of the most influential philosophical mind of the last two and a half
centuries. Kant simply abstracts all that he can say about his transcendental subject (the
“I think”) from whatever, independently, can be derived from his account of the various
kinds of judgment he allows; but these are themselves drawn up only dialectically – that
is, from a quarrelsome literature, not from any examination of the salient competences
manifest in actual practices in any of the arts or sciences.16 In fact, the “free play of the
imagination” featured in the third Critique has led figures like Wilhelm Dilthey and Ernst
Cassirer  to  weigh the  possibility  that  Kant  may have signaled the  need for  a  looser
account of the “system” of the categories than he offers in the first Critique – in order,
precisely,  to  account for  the historical  nature of  human being itself  (Dilthey)  or  the
emergence of novel “symbolic forms” (Cassirer) that may not be able to be accounted for
on the basis of Kant’s original system.
35 I am concerned here to demonstrate how impossible it is to justify any plausible account
of the admitted work of the sciences and arts without a ramified theory of the nature of
the human self. I’ve dwelt on Kant’s and Hume’s theories of the self in order to remind us
of just how impoverished a picture Western philosophy was obliged to draw on by the end
of the 18th century (at the very dawning of “modern” modern philosophy, ushered in by
Kant’s great revolution) and how through the work of analytic philosophy in the 20th
century we have somehow returned once again to the impoverishment of the concept,
signaled in different ways (as I’ve suggested) by strategically placed figures like Wilfrid
Sellars and Charles Taylor.
36 Let  me  clinch  the  point,  therefore,  by  merely  citing  what  Kant  offers  in  abruptly
introducing the idea of a cognizing function, the “I think,” which he calls a “concept” or
“judgment” but  which has  no other  function to  perform except  what  is  confined as
follows:
The I think [Kant affirms] must be able to accompany all my representations; for
otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all,
which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or
else at least would be nothing for me.
37 It is only because I can combine a manifold of given representations in one consciousness
that  it  is  possible  for  me  to  represent  the  identity  of  the  consciousness  in  these
representations itself, i.e., the analytical unity of apperception is only possible under the
presupposition of some synthetic one.17
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38 There’s the deus ex machina of Kant’s first Critique: all of the analyses of the sciences and
arts, of theoretical and practical matters, of judgment and sensibility, are formulated (by
Kant) without sustained or direct attention to whatever is problematic about experience
or practice or the influence of history or prejudice or perspective or the Bildung of a
human being.  This,  of  course,  was Herder’s  prescient worry and the focus of  Hegel’s
profound correction.
39 But apart from these instructive details, the most forceful demonstration of what must be
recovered belongs decisively  to  Ernst  Cassirer,  though the lesson’s  already obscurely
adumbrated in Kant himself and among the post-Kantian Idealists and their progeny.
Cassirer’s  “philosophy  of  symbolic  forms”  is  at  once  a  Hegelianized  eclipse  of  the
adequacy of  Kant’s  transcendentalism and an attempt at  recouping the  Hegelianized
possibilities of a Kantian-like reformulation of the “I think” that effectively admits the a
posteriori standing of the resultant transcendental definition of the “categories” of “all”
our Wissenschaften (sciences, studies, arts, technologies) constructed under the condition
of history and historicity. Cassirer “commits” himself to Kant’s transcendental outlook
but does not actually “demonstrate” the necessity of the transcendental categories. In
effect, he converts Kant’s “critique of reason [into] a critique of culture.”18 The truth is,
Cassirer supersedes the Kantian categories by introducing an openended evolving set of
“symbolic forms”: most tellingly perhaps in his account of the late phases of modern
physics.  He’s  aware  of  this  (and  admits  the  fact  obliquely),  but  avoids  a  direct
confrontation with the Marburg Kantians. There’s the upshot of the Kantian heritage for
our time.
40 Which is to say: the resources of the productive or creative agency of the “I” cannot be
construed abstractly (in the manner of Kant’s first Critique) but must follow the actual
exemplars of how history and experience are concretely exploited. In effect, the entire
fund of cultural history informs our picture of the inventive powers of the “I.” That is
precisely what Hegel attempts to gather in his critique of Kant: what cannot possibly be
defined or transcendentally confirmed according to Kant’s conception. It would not be
unreasonable  therefore  to  read  Kuhn’s  Structure  of  Scientific  Revolutions,  Nietzsche’s
Genealogy of Morals, Hegel’s Aesthetics, and Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms as pointed
reflections on the functional powers of the “I think” in the segregated spaces of science,
moral  reflection,  the  aesthetics  of  fine  art,  history,  mythic  imagination,  religion,
technology, semiotics, interpretation, and whatever other sectors of human interest Kant
fails  to  feature;  and  to  see  in  their  kind  of  contribution  the  need  to  oblige  Kant’s
transcendental inquiries to address the very problem he bruits in acknowledging the
nearly completely neglected role of the “I.” The analysis of the “I” and the analysis of its
powers are inseparable.
41 Seen this  way,  there  is  and  can  be  no  principled  disjunction  between concepts  and
categories:  the  a  priori  is  no  more  than  a  posteriori  while  remaining  a  second-order
conjecture; there cannot be any universally adequate closed system of the categories of
description and explanation; general predicates make sense only in the context of their
provisional  exemplars,  which must  themselves  be  continually  replaced with evolving
experience; every vestige of strict universality and substantive necessity must and can be
retired;  inquiry (of  every kind)  must  be inherently openended,  subject  to potentially
radical revision however regulated by our evolving notions of the relative adequacy of
our  experience  and  theories;  and  the  unity  of  all  such  efforts,  whether  among  the
Constructing a Person
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, I-1/2 | 2009
11
sciences or between the sciences and the arts, cannot but depend on our theories of how
persons are culturally constituted and what we take their evolving “natures” to be.
⁂
42 In this sense Cassirer’s penchant for the idiom of universality and necessity (a Kantian
disorder, let us say) must be set aside in the same way Hegel’s extravagances are, by
redefining  the  continuum of  the  finite  and  the  infinite  in  terms  of  the  moving  but
insuperably inaccessible “limit” of human inquiry, which bids fair to facilitate (in a new
way) the unity of the arts and sciences. The prototype of this mode of reconciliation,
incipiently perceived among the post-Kantian Idealists, was perhaps most perspicuously
remarked, in terms of rational hope more than of accessible knowledge, somewhat later
than the middle of the 19th century, somewhat after the publication of Darwin’s Origin of
Species,  by  that  oddly  transplanted German Idealist  the  American pragmatist  Charles
Sanders Peirce, whose theories Cassirer was aware of and in certain important respects
unexpectedly shared.19 Cassirer simply restricts the more strenuous Kantian idiom to the
compartmentalized space of his “symbolic forms”; but he does not treat the “forms” as
demonstrably necessary categorial constellations – or as “complete.”
43 In any case, Cassirer locates a particularly strategic – in fact a decisive – piece of evidence
regarding the physical sciences that confirms the inherent provisionality of Kant’s entire
table  of  transcendental  categories:  which,  once  admitted,  marks  the  historicity  of
explanatory  theories  among  the  physical  sciences,  the  a  posteriori  standing  of
transcendental  apriority  (when separated  from transcendentalist  presumptions);  and,
most important, the need for an enriched account of the “nature” of human agents and
inquirers, which ranges over the whole of human life (including the arts, religion, and
myth) often against the scientistic models of science that still prevail.20 All of this bears
directly on the prospect of reconceiving what it is to be a science.
44 Cassirer himself seems to have believed – it’s the nerve of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms
– that the model of transcendental necessity and universality in Kant’s first Critique is
resilient enough to accommodate the “classical” system of Galilean-Newtonian dynamics
[and] the principles on which it rested [drawn from “observed phenomena” in such a way
that] the basic framework of physical reality seemed to have been established once and
for all [as well as that deeper] revolution in method in the field of physical theory [first
developed by Heinrich Hertz and Wilhelm Helmholtz, which turned away] from the copy
theory  of  physical  knowledge  [based  on  sensory  representation]  to  [favor]  a  purely
symbolic theory.
45 That is, turned away from confining explanatory theory to the limited data of sensory
perception (applied to conceptually instantiated explananda and their matched explanantia)
in order to treat perceptual data in a freer way – as “signs” of their compliance with 
independent, mathematically invented abstract functions, no longer constrained by the
initial categories governing sensuous intuition in Kant’s sense (but to which, within the
resources of some present history, the observable data could then be shown to conform).
21 The upshot of this single,  seemingly small  adjustment is philosophically electric.  It
shows  unmistakably  that  Cassirer  eclipsed  the  supposed  “completeness”  of  Kant’s
categories even as he presented himself as an orthodox neo-Kantian: it marks the nerve
of the radical revision, within the Kantian movement, of the very idea of a closed system
of description and explanation.
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46 If you consider the transformation Cassirer carefully flags here, you begin to see that his
own loyal and generous adherence to the Kantian philosophy – or to as much of the
Marburg  interpretation as  he  dared concede  –  may already be  too  sanguine  for  the
Hegelian innovations he’s also adopted. They already implicate a conception of an active
subject – an “I think,” if you like, or, better, an “I” capable of inventing in the freest way
explanatory proposals of a hitherto unforeseen “transcendental” sort, well beyond the
assured ken of Kant’s “completed” table of transcendental categories (and his “I think”).
That  is  part  of  the  upshot  of  Cassirer’s  conception  of  “symbolic  forms”  applied
particularly among the sciences and judiciously extended to the spheres of myth, art,
language,  history,  and  the  like,  regardless  of  Cassirer’s  “official”  use  of  Kant’s
transcendental idiom.22
47 My own conjecture has it that what must be added here cannot be slimmer than whatever
may  be  required  in  admitting  creativity  and  agency  among  the  arts,  technology,
philosophy, and practical life. There’s the point of pursuing Kant’s failure to fulfil his own
transcendental goal. This may be fairly counted as the beginning of “modern” modern
philosophy, sketched first in Hegel’s classic anticipation in the Phenomenology – however
unmanageably  for  his  successors.  Once  you  admit  that  the  sciences  are  artifactual
constructs of a kind no longer minimally restricted to the boundary conditions of sensory
experience (either descriptively or explanatorily) and open, as a consequence, to a new
sort  of  confirmation  under  conditions  of  historicity  prepared  to  abandon  all
presumptions of necessity and universality, there can be no antecedent limitations on
explanatory  concepts  and  categories  that  could  possibly  vindicate  Kant’s  original
convictions regarding transcendental closure or the limitations Kant imposes on the “I
think.” Kant’s picture is already too thin for Cassirer’s needs!
48 The  fact  is  that  the  original  appearance  of  organismic  life  may  have  been  due  to
contingencies of a fortuitous and probabilistic sort that cannot be shown to depend on
causal  laws  of  the  classic  kind.23 Universality  and  necessity  may  be  conceptual
extravagances that finite inquiry cannot validate – however useful such idealizations may
prove to be.  Here,  the contingencies of  the arts,  politics,  natural-language discourse,
history, and the adequacy of institutional practices fitted to all the contexts of human
interest militate against the presumption of ever discovering “the” changeless order of
things.  It’s  in this sense that the new unity of  the arts and sciences depends on the
cognitive complexity of the role we assign the human subject in all our inquiries. Cassirer
has put his finger on a decisive reductio of the Kantian orthodoxy he does not directly
attack.
49 There are indeed some telltale oddities in Kant’s first Critique that (against the Critique’s
intention) hasten the eclipse of Kant’s version of his own transcendental revolution. If,
for instance, you treat Euclid’s geometry and Newton’s physics as the natural sites of
Kant’s way of proceeding philosophically, then it’s quite impossible to make compelling
conjectures about the necessity, universality, fixity, or completeness of Kant’s table of
basic categories – except conditionally, relative to whatever is generated in the actual
history  of  science:  the  contingent  successes  of  what  Kant  calls  the  faculty  of
understanding  (Verstand) must  then  be  seen  to  introduce  no  more  than  a  run  of
empirically contingent concepts for which,  on Kant’s own say-so,  reason (Vernunft) is
expected to discern those deeper universal categories that necessarily inform whatever
concepts belong to any particular interval of historical adequacy. But the idea was wildly
off the mark with respect to both non-Euclidean geometry and relativity physics – and, as
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we now realize, it had to be. It takes but a moment’s reflection to grasp the telling fact
that historicity and universality are bound to be finally incompatible.
50 If  the  theory-laden  “givens”  of  perceptual  experience  are  themselves  emergently  or
historically contingent, then the transcendental universals under which they are rightly
subsumed cannot be more than conditional as well. Consider only that we seem capable of
endlessly improvising new concepts and categories to match evolving experience – at
precisely the same time that experience obliges us to make the effort! How could we
possibly claim that  any closed system of  categories would be sufficient  for  all  time?
Nevertheless,  it’s  here,  precisely,  that  Kant  reverses  the  seemingly  sensible  order  of
things – in order to ensure the apriorist standing of his own thesis. He holds (as, in effect,
we’ve  seen)  that  “the  categories  arise  independently  from  sensibility  merely  in  the
understanding,” and that in this sense “the manifold that is given in a sensible intuition
necessarily belongs under the original synthetic unity of apperception, since through this
alone is the unity of the intuition possible.”24
51 Kant never shows that this must be true, and indeed, given Cassirer’s argument, the claim
is defective on its face. For the “I think” ensures the unity of the categories merely by
introducing “the logical function of judgments” and confirms (tautologically) that the
completeness and closure of the system of our categories are rationally assured, since
otherwise  no  “deduction”  of  the  categories  could  claim  its  necessary  standing.25
Extraordinary trickery! That is, Kant does not grasp the falsity of his own constraint on
the  intelligibility  of  the  physical  sciences  for  the  same  reason  he  cannot  grasp  the
conceptual limitation of the Newtonian picture of a valid physical science (one, say, that
claims not to “feign hypotheses”): he was unable to anticipate the innovations of Hertz
and Helmholtz in exactly the same sense in which he could not imaging a non-Euclidean
geometry. But once grant that, we cannot fail to see that the categorial requirements of
all of Cassirer’s symbolic forms must be constructed and empirically testable rather than
transcendentally confirmed in Kant’s apriorist sense.
52 Cassirer’s discovery develops along entirely different lines from Kant’s own philosophical
strategy. What Cassirer demonstrates in taking account of modern physics’ eclipse of the
“copy theory” of science (which in Kant’s book presupposes the passivity or receptivity of
sensibility)26 is nothing less than the knockdown evidence that the mathematized thought
of modern physics (the a priori  construction of mathematical “objects,” say) is  indeed
explanatorily  productive  just  where  it  frees  itself  from  a  “reliance  on  sensuous  or
perceptual guides.” That is precisely its “intellectual triumph.”27
53 Cassirer obviously goes beyond the most canonical of Kant’s constraints: the inclusive and
changeless categories said to govern all sensuous intuition. In doing that, Cassirer signals
the cognate effect  of  additional  creative possibilities  bearing on categorial  “thought”
among inquiries involving other of Cassirer’s “symbolic forms.” But none of this would
have  been  conceivable  if  we  lacked  a  sufficiently  enriched  account  of  what  the  “I”
signifies: the evolving, self-inventive self or agent of any human inquiry whatsoever – a
figure closer therefore to Hegel than to Kant but distinct from both. Cassirer’s innovation
ranges without let or reference to Kantian systematicity over any sustainable inquiry.
Cassirer obviously breaks with Kant’s transcendentalism but is loath to admit the fact
explicitly. There’s the breakthrough that topples Kant’s apriorism and signals the insup-
erably historicized cast of the a posteriori second-order conjectures of what a science or
objective inquiry is or must be.
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54 I must make my amends now. I’ve been as careless as Hume and Kant about the nature of
the  human  self.  Well,  perhaps  not  altogether,  since we’ve  gained  important  ground
against their utterly disastrous and inexplicable retreat. Because it’s obvious that neither
Hume nor Kant – nor Sellars, to join the centuries in a pointed way – could possibly
account for their respective analyses of mind and world without admitting the full powers
of a competent human agent. (I have yet to explain what such an “agent” must be like. I
shall  leave  that  question  largely  unanswered  here.  The  answer  requires  a  fresh
beginning.)
55 Indeed, very nearly the entire question has been reopened in recent years in a distinctly
courageous  (entirely  serendipitous)  way  by  a  young  Australian  philosopher,  David
Chalmers. Chalmers confronts in great detail  the entire reductionist and eliminativist
brotherhood (to which he would otherwise happily belong but for the unresolved puzzle
of “consciousness”). He intends much the same puzzle that was posed more than thirty
years ago by Thomas Nagel with regard to the “subjective aspect” of phenomenological
“experience,” which has never been satisfactorily explained.28 Nagel was right of course;
but Nagel never cast his own challenge in a way that might have precluded dualism. That,
ultimately, is what I think we must recover. Dualism is itself a relatively innocent (but
blind) strategy for impoverishing our conception of the self along reductionistic lines.
56 Chalmers’s question is not quite the deeper question Hume, Kant, and even Sellars signal
(without answering). Nevertheless, what he offers mobilizes the entire literature of the
philosophy of mind in a more perspicuous way than the 18th-century or the usual 20th-
century theories of mind (which Chalmers effectively dismantles) had ever managed to
afford. I mean: the question of what a person or self (a subject or agent) must be, in any
sense that concedes a “first-person” or phenomenological dimension to human life.
57 Chalmers broaches no more than the question of consciousness biologically confined, and
he does so only against the backdrop of an otherwise apparently adequate reductionism.
But  in  pursuing  the  failure  of  reductionism there,  he  inadvertently  opens  the  entire
reductive undertaking to a measure of scrutiny that can no longer preclude the culturally
“penetrated” (culturally transformed) powers of the artifactual selves that we are. The
Kantian  origins  of  positivism  made  it  possible  for  positivism’s  late  Anglo-American
progeny to ignore the post-Kantian and Hegelian complication for a very long time. But
now that that company has itself  begun to consider incorporating Hegel’s  distinctive
resources, Chalmers’s appealing challenge cannot fail to resonate with the latent lessons
recovered for example by reviewing Cassirer’s deeper challenge. A similar confrontation
addressed  to  the  standard  account  of  the  methodology  of  the  sciences  in  general
featuring reductionism,  the analysis  of  causality,  and a commitment to exceptionless
covering laws, is now in the process of being revived and deepened (in tandem with the
first) by what amounts to a second reading of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
Thomas Nagel’s  well-known anticipation of  Chalmers’s  complaint required Chalmers’s
added voice in order to be effective both in the setting of the philosophy of mind and in
the philosophy of science – and in our reflections about culture and history.
58 There’s the matter Hume and Kant and Sellars, in addition to the champions of scientism
and  the  laxer  champions  of  “hermeneutics”  in  Charles  Taylor’s  sense,  have  largely
ignored. The fact is,  a “reformed” reductionist like Chalmers (reformed in rather the
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same sense in which an alcoholic is “reformed”) holds precisely the same minimal view
about the functional powers of human agents (for instance, “the reportability of mental
states,” “the ability of a system to access its own internal states,” “the ability to discrimi-
nate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli,” “the integration of information by
a cognitive system,” “the focus of attention,” “the deliberate control of behavior”) that
Charles Taylor, as the devoted opponent of reductionism and scientism that he is, would
surely be prepared to avow.29 But they would intend completely different readings of the
questions broached: both would restrict themselves to “biology” of course, but Taylor
would feature hermeneutic concerns and Chalmers would regard his own examples as
yielding to some form of reductionism or computationalism.
59 It’s here that Chalmers falters – just where Taylor misreads the persistent eligibility of
the  reductive  option:  for  Taylor  believes  the  experiential  or  phenomenological
complication  of  the  “functional”  powers  of  persons  instantly  entails  the  defeat  of
reductionism, whereas Chalmers believes the “functional” aspect of the powers (just
enumerated)  can  be accounted for  reductively.  It’s  only  the “additional”  presence of
consciousness  or  experience  (in  the  biological  sense)  that  threatens  to  defeat
reductionism! Chalmers fails – utterly and tellingly – because he separates what he calls
“the  hard  problem”  of  consciousness  from “the  easy  problem”  of  all  the  functional
achievements (according to his lights) of the “I’s” mode of functioning. But of course he
means by this that the easy problems do not in principle require consciousness in his
sense though they can tolerate its presence. Whereas the essential point remains that the
artifactual powers of the “I” cannot be captured at all by any purely biological model of
consciousness but requires an account of the hybrid form of reflexive intelligence (“self-
consciousness,”  if  you  like)  that  dawns  only  with  the  mastery  of  language  and  its
accommodating  culture.  As  I  say,  the  “I”  is  thoroughly  artifactual,  the  continually
ramified achievement of  the power of  enlanguaged self-reference;  whereas “mind” is
initially  emergent  in  the  biological  sense:  in  the  human  case,  of  course,  the  “I”  is
inseparable  from  the  culturally  “penetrated”  (transformed,  second-natured,  hybrid)
powers of what is originally given (biologically) as mind.
60 Both Chalmers and Taylor go terribly wrong. Both miss the deeper issue: the discovery
that  what  belongs  to  the  subjective  experience  and  agency  of  persons  is  already
inextricably implicated in their functional ability to hear and comprehend speech, to see a
Vermeer interior, to produce Michelangelo’s David, to test a mathematized hypothesis of
physical  theory with regard to what may be sensorily perceived (in the way Cassirer
stipulates). There’s the heart of the matter, the still-elusive link that ensures the common
ground that the arts and sciences share. The functional treatment of computers need not
be the same as the functional treatment of selves. Chalmers puts the point memorably –
and innocently – thus: the easy problems [of consciousness] are easy precisely because
they concern the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions. To explain a cognitive
function, we need only specify a mechanism that can perform the function. The methods
of cognitive science are well-suited for this sort of explanation, and so are well-suited to
the easy problems of  consciousness.  By contrast,  the hard problem is  hard precisely
because it is not a problem about the performance [or “causal role”] of functions [“in the
production of behavior that a system might perform”]. The problem persists even when
the performance of all the relevent functions is explained.30
61 But that  is  also what  is  being contested!  For if  Chalmers’s  problem of  consciousness
remains unresolved – that is, if the consciousness implicated in the human version of the
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“functions” he concedes is not demonstrably reducible,  if  function and consciousness
cannot be disjoined in the central  human cases – then selves and persons (and their 
functions) cannot be reduced either. Until we find a satisfactory resolution, the theory of
the  human and natural  sciences  and of  the  sciences and arts  will  never  escape  the
constructivist alternative I’ve been hinting at.  Chalmers embraces as a problem what
Sellars appears to dismiss in the way of a solution! But he fails to see that in advancing his
worry about  “consciousness” he himself  has,  by conceding Nagel’s  original  challenge
about reflexive experience, inadvertently opened the inquiry to include the enlanguaged
and encultured complexities of “self-consciousness.” Seen this way, it’s an open question
whether, in the human paradigm, Chalmers’s reductive solution of the “easy problems of
consciousness” is not generally dependent on the solution to the “hard problem”; hence,
that the extension of the reductive solution to so-called easy problems without invoking
the hard problem of consciousness at all remains a benign concession condoned by the
intransigence of the other.
62 There are, of course, different models of phenomenological perception to choose from –
and, indeed, others that will surely appear in due time. But we can already see that it
would be advantageous if our phenomenology avoided every form of cognitive privilege
and foundational  presumption (of  the  sort  one  finds in  Descartes  and Locke,  in  the
original  Protokolsätze  of  the  Positivists,  in  Husserl’s  account  of  transcendental
phenomenology,31 and of course in Kant’s apriorism) without abandoning the artifactual
nature of phenomenology itself. For phenomenology essentially features the conditions
of reportage vis-à-vis what is “given” in any mode of first-person experience; and that 
cannot fail to be culturally penetrated.
63 There’s the fatal limitation of any Kantian approach to phenomenology: Kant insists on
the passivity of sensuous intuition. Hence, we must make provision, phenomenologically,
for the transformed (or gebildet)  or culturally “penetrated” nature of  the “given” (as
sound is “perfused” by meaning when transformed into speech). This would account for a
pertinent form of conceptual “adequation” between world and mind – within the working
space of our artifactual modes of cognition (or interpretation or appreciation or the like).
It also confirms a rough similarity between the point of Wittgenstein’s original question
about action and bodily movement and Husserl’s question about the “natural” and what
is putatively “pure” in the phenomenological sense: except that Wittgenstein eschews all
privilege and Husserl’s solution relies on privilege.
64 You may then also anticipate that to admit the gebildet, hybrid, “second-natured” nature
of  our  particular  mode of  life  suggests  a  generic  formula  for  specifying any and all
versions of encultured mind (within the sciences or other possible “symbolic forms” of
cultural engagement), according to which what counts as information, meaning, semiotic
import of any kind can be effectively accessed by apt agents and selves whose brains and
bodies and environing world are already coded for such feats.  Notably,  both Peirce’s
theory of signs and Cassirer’s semiotics32 need not disallow the accessing of information
outside  the  brain  –  as  among  computers,  biochemical  processes,  causally  affective
actions, suitably constructed artifacts such as musical performances and paintings.33
65 Considerations of these sorts begin to impose conceptual liens on what to suggest as a
reasonable  theory  of  the  human  self  without  actually  privileging  any  particular
“metaphysics.” Embracing the minimal lesson of Kant’s Copernican turn (corrected along
Hegelian lines),  as that has been construed from Kant’s time to ours,  we may indeed
acknowledge that there are always a number of promising – potentially incompatible –
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ways of modeling the human “subject” or “agent” with an eye to providing an adequate
theory of culture or of the unity of the natural and human sciences or the sciences and
the arts. Whatever has been adduced thus far is meant to be as neutral as possible relative
to arguments already mounted. Seen this way, we are, I would say, plainly pressed in a
direction  that  has  not  yet  been  seriously  considered  among  the  most  influential
movements  of  Western  metaphysics,  nor  satisfactorily  defined  by  other  movements
known to be sympathetic to conceptions like the one I have in mind.
66 Here  an  obvious  (entirely  provisional)  economy  suggests  itself.  For  one  thing,
eliminativism has never come to terms with the “dangling” status of persons and their
intentions,34 which (as reported) Sellars is content to add (rhetorically) to what he calls
his “scientific image”: I say, dismiss the option as completely inoperative – for instance,
for failing to accommodate Cassirer’s insight about the import of the shift in physics from
Galileo and Newton to Helmholtz and Hertz. For another, reductionism may be put on
indefinite hold, inasmuch as no satisfactory exemplar has ever been formulated, though
reductionism itself need never disallow the central mass of anthropocentric distinctions
(including consciousness) normally invoked in speaking of selves and persons: I say, put
reductionism on hold until it can bring a promising materialist (or functional) paraphrase
to  the  table.  For  a  third,  dualism is  a  philosophical  scandal  or  a  seriously  inchoate
intuition;  in  fact,  failed reductionisms often appear  as  disappointing dualisms.  I  say,
dismiss dualism in the same spirit in which it would be right to dismiss eliminativism. If,
with me,  you go this far,  then I  suggest there is  no promising strategy left  except a
constructivism that accords with what I’ve been calling internal and external Bildung –
particularly an account in accord with the latter, since the latter is meant to explain the
sense in which the former is operative at all. If you allow this much, then it should be
clear as well that our theories are bound to be guided by the Darwinian discovery. I see no
better advice than a word in favor of combining these last reflections with the positive
gains  due  to  admitting  the  primacy  of  phenomenology  and  the  penetration  of  the
cultural.
67 I have not yet said what we should mean by the terms “person” and “culture” – or by “a
person” and “a culture”; actually I’ve kept myself from answering. Because, for one thing,
the argument I’ve just laid out is something of a prolegomenon to any fruitful answer of
the definitional sort; and for another, because what we learn informally from what we
take to be salient in that prolegomenon is likely to be more important in our grasp of a
larger  world  of  relations  than  whatever  precision  we  may  bring  to  theories  and
definitions grounded in a contingent and shallow intuition. I shouldn’t want any quarrel
about  the  limited  merit  of  any  specific  posit  of  mine  (regarding  the  definition  of
“person”) to detract from the force of an ampler line of reasoning (the one just sketched)
that seems (to me at least) to lead irresistibly in the direction of:
(a) construing persons or selves as artifactual transforms of the members of Homo sapiens,
constructed  or  constituted  by  acquiring  certain  fluent  sui  generis  powers  unique  to
themselves: speech for instance; self-reference; enlanguaged thought, perception, feeling,
intention, judgment, interpretation, choice, commitment, creativity, and learning;
(b)  construing culture  as a  historically specific  ensemble of  processes of  internal  and
external Bildung: artifactually formed, collectively shared and transmitted among cohorts
of aggregated persons, through the effective force of which new generations of persons
are first formed and continually transformed, and through which, also, societies are kept
viable, under the condition and effect of their self-transforming histories.
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68 These are the touchstones of my theory, valid (if they are valid at all) in virtue of one very
large conviction: namely, that the whole of the specifically human world is the upshot of
the transformation of our biological talents – the incarnation of meaning in sound for
instance, as in transforming sound into speech (internal Bildung) – a process first made
possible, evolvingly, by the sui generis emergence from animal sources of true language
and its attendant cultural powers (external Bildung). Whatever of the human world may
then  rightly  claim  independent  standing  of  any  kind  –  speech,  history,  behavior,
institutions, art and technology, archives of any sort – will be seen to be hybrid artifacts
“uttered” by individual and aggregated persons, intrinsically open to interpretation and
altered meaning as  a  result  of  having been produced or interpreted or submitted to
interpretation under the evolving powers of human inquiry.
69 But what does that entail,  you ask, when contrasted with dualism, reductionism, and
eliminativism? Minimally, the only possible answer that I can think of is some sui generis
form of emergentism: artifactual,  for one thing,  because it  depends on the artifactual
incipience  and  evolution  of  true  language,  not  Darwinian  though  it  requires  the
overlapping contributions of biological and cultural evolution, where the second cannot
be reduced to the first and is essentially different from it; and, for another, indissolubly
incarnate in biological things (preeminently, our self-constituting selves and their second-
natured aptitudes) or incarnate in mere physical things, as what selves can utter, do,
create, or produce (as, say, speech, actions, paintings, machines, technologies, histories,
traditions and the like), hybrid transforms of natural things so constituted by virtue of
the enlanguaged and encultured activities of apt selves.
70 If, now, we turn back to Wittgenstein’s prescient question: “what is left over if I subtract
the  fact  that  my  arm  goes  up  from  the  fact  that  I  raise  my  arm”35 –  a  question
Wittgenstein does not explicitly answer – we ourselves may now venture a distinctly
worth-while  answer  by  way  of  construing  “my  raising  my  arm”  as  a  metonym  for
encultured “utterances” of any and every kind. For one thing, there can be nothing “left
over” since subtraction here, read literally, would entail an unacceptable dualism. Per
contra, if the question is meant to query what is it that transforms a physical movement
into an action (or a sound into a word, or a painted canvas into a painting), the answer is
that it is rightly construed as what is duly “uttered” by the “utterance” of some person or
persons  –  what,  minimally,  remains  as  culturally  significant  when the subtraction is
completed.
71 Rearing an infant in a society of  apt persons is,  effectively,  uttering a new person –
transforming the infant into an apt agent within its home society. I utter a formal garden
and a curse and a murder and a poem in different ways, but they all implicate the same
“internalist”  form  of  causality  (if  you  agree  to  call  utterance  or  agency  a  kind  of
causality). Our world is becoming increasingly artifactual, so that physical nature itself is
abstractly constituted by a sort of subtraction akin to what Wittgenstein has in mind; that
is, nature is so designated by the subtractive efforts of an artifactual science, even if it is
not itself ught to have been culturally uttered or constituted as such.
72 That explains at a stroke the difference between the kinds of “objectivity” accorded the
physical and the human sciences and arts and the sense in which inquiries and activities
of every human kind implicate the role of persons in essentially the same way. We may
then answer Wittgenstein thus: whatever might otherwise be deemed to be a “natural
thing” (a thing that may be rightly described and explained in terms of natural causes) is
judged, when deemed to belong intrinsically to the world of human culture, to have been
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transformed or  penetrated so  that  it  is  rightly  said  to  possess  in  a  public  way –  its 
“nature”  being  adequated  to  its  possessing  in  some  objectively  determinable  way  –
indissolubly incarnate attributes of  cultural  significance and signification (expressive,
representational,  signific,  symbolic,  semiotic,  linguistic,  intentional,  institutional,
normative, historical). Which, therefore, profoundly alters our conception of objectivity,
a valid science, causality, the causal closure of the physical, the laws of nature, scientific
inquiries beyond the scope of  causal  explanation among the physical  sciences,  truth,
universality, material necessity, the rigor and nature of a human science and cognate
disciplines, and the very idea of a science of interpretation.
73 This  much,  I  think,  is  relatively  uncontroversial  to  all  philosophies  that  eschew
eliminativism and dualism or that oblige reductionism to provide a reasonably promising
exemplar of a science or discipline of its own choosing before reductionism itself may
claim more than second-class citizenship. These are philosophies prepared to enrich our
theory of selves or persons in ways that compare favorably with what is usually taken to
be the normal run of competences of the apt members of a society of persons. Beyond all
that, questions turn quarrelsome as they become more detailed – often therefore more
interesting. In the meanwhile, we begin to see the general lineaments of a conception of
the unity of the natural and the human sciences, and of the arts and sciences, that goes
entirely contrary to the reductive motivation of the canonical accounts. It’s the ubiquity
of the self that entails the unity of all the forms of human inquiry and agency. And the
self is itself an artifact of the human form of life produced at long last by the processes of
external Bildung now ubiquitously regularized in the historied forms of internal Bildung.
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